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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

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POETIC CREATION AND CRITICISM

[The theory of *Rasadhvani*, found in Sanskrit writings, which **Prof. V. Sitaramiah** of the Maharaja's College, Mysore, analyses here, with its ramifications and its correlatives, and especially in its bearing upon literature, is an important contribution to æsthetics. The creative artist takes the Way of Beauty as the philosopher, the Way of Knowledge. Both ways lead towards spiritual realisation.—ED.]

In the doctrines of *Rasanabhava* and *Rasadhvani*, Indian writers on poetics bring together the poet, poetry and the reader[1] under one unifying principle of enjoyment. *Rasa*—relish—is deemed the essence of experiencing a work of art. It is a mental enjoyment and the reader is transported into a world of feeling and relation where he so forgets himself and the conditions of his material environment that he is in a state of joy akin to heavenly bliss. Limitations falling off, he ceases to be an isolated individual. He dips into an aspect of consciousness which widens into the deep universalities at the root of his own being, making him for a time a part of all Life and all Cosmos. Only, he should be a *Sahrdaya*, one who by nature and habit, by taste and culture, is trained to tune himself sympathetically to the impact of any true work of art. This relish through the power of suggestion is India's highest explanation of æsthetic perception.[2]

Beyond this point inquiry does

[1] This applies roughly to the other arts as well, subject to modification by their respective mediums, technique and conventions.

[2] A few terms deserve to be remembered, for they throw light on, and can be adapted to explain, the creative stage as well. *Rasa* is variously rendered into English as instinct, emotion and mood; *Dhvani* and *Vyanjana*, as oblique reference in communication; *Sadharanikarana* is generalisation: a process whereby a particular context gets universalised; *Alaukikata* is an uncommon, heightened, detached uniqueness of sensing and feeling; *Avaranabhanga* is the dropping off of all limiting secular circumstances, which facilitates emancipation from "dailiness." The *Sahrdaya's* is a vital rôle; for without such a medium no positive mental enjoyment (*Manasa Asvadana*) and no creative communication is possible.

not seem to have been specialised to make possible the kind of interpretation and evaluation which figures as literary criticism in the West. The West also goes more fully into the processes of creation. Studies of personality of the creative kind and their application to literature have lit up fields which till now were dark and uncharted. Though the Indian students put acute analysis into their description of *Kavivyapara* (the Poet-function) through the imaginative genius (*Pratibha*) of a poet, their attention was more directed to giving first-aid to writers and critics on details of formal rhetoric, the subtleties of distinction and classification and their relative importance in judgment.

Pratibha is described as the primary cause of all poetic creation. It is a power of imagination, a flash of vision which realises—in ever new modes of relationship and significance—a concrete thing, a situation, a composite of events, a thought, a theme or an occasion, in an arresting, individual way each time. It is described as free, riotous and various, irrepressible and sovereign, and poets thrill and render homage to it. Some call it a gift of the Gods, others call it inspiration; a direct whispering by the Muses, or a whole communication from them, the poets are merely recorders; channels or instruments.[1]

Yet is there need to call it an unearthly accession or an advent from outside? The intensity of what used to be called "possession," the accompanying vibrancy of the physical and neural system, the resultant work of Beauty, seem all to be so mysterious, so different in dimension that supernatural associations have been attributed to it. But much of this is metaphor used to light up a phenomenon which awes or overwhelms us, strikes us with wonder[2] or delights us to the core. The *How* of it all is now closely analysed in laboratories or is pieced together from the journals of the artists, or by students who generalise from data, or is worked out as a subordinate branch of some theory of life and knowledge and purpose which men build up to convey their "mental construction of reality."

Poetic creation is a synthetic act where the co-operation and organisation of many elements of feeling, imagination and intelligence occur in varying proportions simultaneously as they go to shaping expression. What happens in the mind of the poet as the mood is closing in, when it is on, or when the fury of the at-first-formless urge takes on direction, can be roughly indicated. The mood quickens the pulse; makes warmer and swifter the circulation of the blood, puts an edge on sensitivity, heightens the

[1] Much of this is familiar ground. We bring together the approaches of the East and the West the better to understand Inspiration and incidentally to indicate the stretch of ground covered by the world of art.

[2] *Vismaya* (wonder) is always said to be present as an element in Beauty.

vital tone, enlarges perception and the sweep and daring of the fancy, releases energies and resources from folds and levels of its own inmost being, memory and association adding, at each turn, image, sound and meaning, patterns of rhythm and movement, suggestion and symbolism, clarities and profundities, gusts and disgusts of affection, subtleties and playfulnesses indeed, all that has gone into the poet's make-up—until it emerges as something *new* even to itself.[1] Beauty is now " born " —or is rendered or discovered—having an independent concrete existence outside the creator's own being.

This process is at once æsthetic, creative and technical. It has a beginning, a middle and an end: Impulsion; the will to form and express through a lively medium; the technique of expression and embodiment in a concrete object of art. This is one phase of the process of art. And, since the artist is a human being in a particular milieu and uses as his medium words,—which are the medium for a million others—with meaning, emotive association, history, quality and feeling, reference and attitude behind them, what is expressed makes meaning to others; *i. e.*, the poet achieves communication.

When, through his delight in the use and possibilities of his medium, he has made it a successful vehicle of his vision, it is " without residue on either side. " The work of art thus throws one span backwards to the springs of its existence (and the conditions and process of its production) and one forwards to its reception, evaluation and criticism. It now begins to be enjoyed or reacted to challengingly, to be absorbed into or thrown out of tradition or asking tradition to modify itself.

Genius is an assumption and a starting-point in all this analysis.[2] Why genius functions in one way and not in another at any time, why it is fitful and not active at all for long periods, why personality keeps fluid and free in rare cases or hardens into character and freezes overlaying expression in others still await study. The Indian writers explained *Pratibhā* as due to *Samskāra* (fruit of refinement and culture) or *Vāsanā* (" latent impressions of experience ") coming down from past existences; for India believed in metempsychosis with inheritance and transmigration of faculty. Yet no explanation is even here offered about why *Samskāra* (or *Vāsanā*) should function in one as creative artistic imagina-

[1] " He builded better than he knew. " Yet, within, we hope, Spearman's definition of nuogenesis.

[2] " That in a fit of absent-mindedness nature raises up souls that are more detached from life...a detachment innate in the structure of sense or consciousness, which at once reveals itself by a virginal manner, so to speak, of seeing, hearing or thinking, etc." This, by Bergson, is beautiful writing but no explanation. Mystic experience corroborates this, though it is different in purpose and essence. My friend Dr. K. A. Khan states, on the authority of Dara Shikoh, that " Sultan-ul-Azkar " is a term current in Sufism which means that the individual plunges into the depths of the universe and, getting vibrations from there, expresses them through himself in a developed stage.

tion and in another as, say, military, political, scientific or culinary ability, unless we make a logical, chain regress into his past births where such faculties were willed, practised or acquired, yielding his present ability which exists in him as power and predisposition. Can we not interpret this on our plane, adapting the terms used in the Indian æsthetics and correlating them with the results of modern mental analysis? Is what the normal man feels as *Rasa*—relish in the presence of a work of art—a form of what functions as creativity?

Though one may not go as far as to say with Freud that "the conscious Ego is passive and that we are 'lived,' as it were, by unknown and uncontrollable forces"; the "Id," as he calls "the impersonal aspect of the Ego" is a strangely powerful reality which, from below the surface, acts and urges as effectively as any instrument of potency seen on the superficies. The man of genius is an individual with special gifts. He is a child of an environment with needs and calls, with limitations, fashions, opportunities, etc.; he comes of a family with local, class or race characteristics; he has faculties; modes of response and preference, behaviour, knowledge of the world and views of destiny. Much of this is product of (and factor in) his individual and social history; this, again, has developed or failed to develop in a secondary environment of mental and institutional climate. He has acquired abilities through training or choice, or by unconscious inhibition, from infancy onwards. His individual traits fix his signature, *i. e.*, the distinctive manner and temper of his work.

But the rest of it is inherited from or shared with all around him, immediate or remote—reaching out to all the essence of whose being is the result of a common evolution. These lie dormant in him at different levels of the conscious, the preconscious and the unconscious—as instinct, memory, association, mood, attitude and impulsions to conduct and in the hinterlands of instinct, feeling and behaviour. They are present as springs and reserves of energy. These racial and almost cosmic levels are thus an unexpressed presence—(an *avyakta Sattva*) primordial and inchoate, crude, massive, hard to rouse, untame most of it, irrepressible when roused, and capable of releasing and throwing up elements unsensed or unsensable normally.

It is to these springs of energy that a genius plunges when his creative impulse is seeking embodiment. At one stroke his personality is released and set to work in the furies, the fluidities and the possibilities of this level of function. His imagination courses there in almost savage exhilaration. May we not take it, that it is this upsurge of general latent resources and abilities that supplies body to his creative urge to form? That, the *Āvaraṇabhanga* having happened, the limitations of the poet's character fall off and

dissolve into a full play of his entire personality ?[1] He then grasps what elements he will of fancy, fact, fulfilment, rhythm or suggestion, even as the father seed may be said to do in the quickened womb of the mother all through the period of shaping—before it is delivered into the world as a fully made child.

Diving into this vortex of energy and resources in the substratum of his sleeping yet enduring potencies (the creative counterpart of the *Sthayis*) the poet rises as from the depths of an ocean or the bowels of the earth with the wealth of imagery, feeling, movement and passion which are in play in forming the impulse. There is always more in that reservoir of resources than is at any time thrown out or selected by the poet, but for the time being his total absorption (*samādhi*) is limited to the specific purpose claiming imperium. And such is its dignity that it does not care to take more or be satisfied with less. The roots of all that is man—now this man,—are thus tapped for fulfilling a purpose. The result is at once singular and universal, intelligible and communicable to all who are men—because it functions at both levels at the same time as one integral unit.

Each poet, according to moment or "ability of attention" is either fully or incompletely inspired or fully or incompletely absorbed. He can be affected differently at different times about the same subject. Other geniuses react differently at the same time. This is what produces the varieties of degree, quality and intensity of vision in expression. Often a disturbance, a deflection or a loosening of grasp (a *śithila samādhi*) hurts the process, bringing in self-consciousness and failure, frustration and false steps. Or one strains after effect and makes the talent and the moment slave to another than an artistic purpose. The work of art is then likely to suffer or be vulgarised. This, however, is certain: that in the act and mood of creation the poet is in a *lōkōttara*—detached—field of sensation and communion. Other demands of men and life are an irritating irrelevance then, or a disturbance causing blight of the spirit. The resulting work of art, which is the child of his genius and of which he is father and mother in one, is more truly his than any child of his flesh in the birth of which another life co-operates or shares with him.[2]

From the creation of the art-object to experiencing its beauty, appreciation, interpretation of mean-

[1] Henry James is described by Lubbock as "in an hour of midnight silence and solitude (opening) the inmost character of his mind," or as "face to face with his genius." (Quoted by H. Read.) All along the line, the present writer is much inclined to think with Mr. Herbert Read, to whose thoughtful essays and references he is deeply indebted.

[2] This fact explains his fondnesses, his ferocious loyalties and the deep hurts he gives and takes in its cause. He hits back, compensates or sublimates in spiteful, mocking or malicious fancy if his genius be for comedy or for satire.

ing and evaluating for achievement lies the field of criticism. Training, experience, sympathy, sensitiveness to art, knowledge of life and literature, a gift for greeting new talent, and an adventurous spirit,—all these go to the making of a critic. And his judgment depends on the quality and the inclusiveness of his taste and the standard of values he uses. When a person with ability expounds or interprets a work of art he builds up a new dimension for it, for the work then develops a social function. As critic he goes into it fully; makes observations on the premises of the piece, the vision in embodiment, the medium and technique of communication, the harmonies and adequacies of each. He compares this work with others of its kind; values it for this or that purpose; classifies or ranks it and relates it to time and tradition. This is as right a response as the enjoyment of it. In so far as he is an *Adhikāri* (one qualified for it) and is, without prejudice, apprehending meaning, his criticism does good and he himself creates value.

Criticism, again, is at different levels. Each age insists on revaluing its inheritance. It has its points and modes of emphasis, its vision. So a body of interpretation and knowledge gathers round every work of art. Also abstract speculation grows up about art's origin, nature, function, form, medium, technique, etc. But the meaning of a work of art is not a static but a dynamic fact. It has a history and it develops at each stage a manner of sensing and appreciation—endlessly—and is defined, enriched and enlarged if it be of any vital significance. Beginning with the artist's fleeting first glimpse, to the finished work of art, and from there to the last word spoken about it by the last man is the stretch of its world of meaning. Either as a mental fact at the time of origination or as value in interpretation, all this is true of it and tenable. The æsthetic, the technical, the artistic and the critical are thus one continuum of meaning, value and validity. And this constitutes the world of art.

For the artist his work has a mental and personal importance, a history. For psychology it has interest as the study of a synthetic mental process. For a practitioner of letters, a fellow poet or a critic it is a study of the use or abuse of a medium—the success or unsuccess of a technical experiment. For the world of art it is an addition to wealth and variety, at once a source of new creation and an end, an item in time and a link in eternity. For the sociologist it is an expression of a social purpose or mode of life. For he, as well as his art and its content, is the product of an environment whose history stretches back over vast periods of time. For criticism, it is an extension of opportunity to rethink premises and standards of taste and judgment. In itself it remains the record of the

career of a spirit, a unique entity, a good.

Generalised, though based on all such individual perceptions and valuations, is the science, the philosophy and the technical or other history of art. This body or system of soundings and valuations which are art, art history and art criticism is as valuable and legitimate as the more purely philosophical, scientific and social branches of knowledge. It contributes to knowledge at many levels—those of being, feeling, thinking, doing and truth. If life be interpreted—as it is by all art first and last—in terms artistic, this whole body of knowledge is a special second-to-none form of predication on the sum total of existences, relations and attitudes which we call Reality.

Art is more sensitively, more essentially human than any other branch of the exercise of the human spirit. For it is a singularly individual expression. Without it philosophy would be the poorer for want of one special element in its composition. Any metaphysic which builds *a priori* theories of art to the neglect of the actual works of art or in contradiction of them is pitifully without blood, body or essence. It is bound to go wrong and be shallow and sterile. In its own right and kind art is a full, free, and can be a commensurate, predication of all Reality.

V. SITARAMIAH

NATURE-CURE

When the proposed Health Assurance Act was being debated in Parliament, Nature-Cure received contemptuous treatment. J. Foster Forbes protests in "A Case for the Nature Practitioner" (*The Modern Mystic and Monthly Science Review*, October 1946) against the branding of the latter's healing ministrations as "irregular practices." Medicine is at once the least exact and the most intolerant of sciences. Irregularity is anathema. The heresy-hunters are always in full cry after the innovator, hounding and belittling the Herbert Barker's and the Sister Kenny's until the success of their methods cannot be denied. Then the mint-stamp of regularity is grudgingly bestowed. Now it is the nature-cure practitioner who has to run before the pack. Finding the cause of disease primarily in the persistent serious disturbance of emotional balance and rhythm, he comes closer to the stand of Paracelsus, with whom modern medicine has still to catch up. He branded as the quack the physician who

> studies diseases in the affected organs, where he finds nothing else but effects which have already taken place....The true physician studies the causes of diseases by studying man as a whole.

But Paracelsus and the nature cure practitioner may have to wait for their full vindication at the hands of orthodoxy until the promising young psychosomatic science grows to maturity.

THE RELIGIOUS REVIVAL ON THE CONTINENT

[**Karl Otten,** a German novelist, biographer and playwright, has been a voluntary exile from his native land since 1933. His sociological study of the structure of modern society with special reference to Germany appeared in London in 1942 under the title *A Combine of Aggression.* He writes here on a debatable theme. We are in full agreement with him as to the need of a religious revival in the true sense, provided that by religion be understood that spirit of our common origin and interests that binds each to every other being. Roman Catholicism, however, is in a new rôle as the defender of democratic rights. The distinction claimed between Roman Catholicism and the Church is dubious and the record of the Church in countries where it has been or is dominant is not reassuring as to the genuineness of its concern that the popular will be done. The age is torn between atheism on the one hand and sacerdotalism on the other; between the two there lies the middle ground of ancient and unchanging Truth.—Ed.]

I wish to make it quite clear that we are witnessing a religious revival of faith, not one that is merely ecclesiastical. This revival, therefore, does not confine itself within the framework of the Churches as given institutions; it goes beyond, cuts far deeper, and is by no means restricted to Germany. The religious revival sweeps over the whole of Europe. It is not merely a consequence of the war, rather is it rooted in the pre-war period. The war, as it were, only supplied the spark which exploded an existing charge.

Roman Catholicism has assumed the leadership of this European, Continental movement ; Roman Catholicism, not the Roman Catholic Church. From the powerful impetus of the movement in France, Italy, Austria and Germany it is permissible to draw conclusions as to the exclusiveness of its spirit which may well hold great surprises for non-Roman Catholic countries, such as the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Yugoslavia.

It must be realized that this modern movement manifests itself, not within the bounds of the private sphere of the religious individual, but as a political, a social, even a socialistic assertion of the popular will in Roman Catholic countries. The will of the people, as established by the French, not by the Russian, Revolution, declares its aims and intentions by means of free suffrage. Only where there is a guarantee that the elector may freely choose between different political parties—not, therefore, under the electoral rules of the Russian Mono-Democracy—Roman Catholic man retains the possibility of expressing and as-

serting his will. Should Franco fall, and should, which is by no means certain, a liberated Spain be endowed with a democratic multipartite electoral law, then it may be assumed that in Spain, too, the party of religious revival will emerge victorious.

Before probing the value of such a revival and examining its ethical significance we have to face the question which Radio Moscow puts in all languages, and which it answers in the affirmative, the question as to whether this movement of religious revival in Europe and, above all, in Germany, is anti-Soviet.

It is not at all easy to answer this question from outside Russia, since it embraces the problem of the Russian people's attitude towards Western civilization. Research workers and observers like Muckermann, Lieb and L. White agree that, strange as it may seem, a Church of the catacombs has come into existence underneath the iron foundations of the Soviet régime, a Church independent of this régime and restricting its compass to the individual and his religion, thus bringing forth spiritual fearlessness. This invisible Church in Russia utilizes all laws of the State for purposes of camouflage. As its symbol I should choose a volcano. Its mouth may measure only a few yards, its light may be only of the strength of a candle, a wisp of a fume of incense. In its depths, however, it widens and reaches the core of the earth.

Any man may experience religious freedom, even the man who has otherwise been silenced under the iron heel of the tyrant. Man gives in and pays his taxes. Nobody, least of all the tyrant, controls what he experiences in his heart. The tyrant cannot survive himself. But the life of the spirit is eternal. The spirit begets the tyrant so that man may recognize, in his ultimate agony, the true value of life in freedom. The Russian has only now come to know it. He is a slow man. He reaches the valley only by infinitely devious ways. But he does reach it in the end.

May it then be said that the Russian, too, has been seized by the same wave of religious revival, and that, therefore, he belongs to us, the other Roman Catholics? The answer, *sub specie æternitatis* and in the sense of Western civilization's continuity, is in the affirmative. The contrast between the Russian man who experiences the religious revival and the system of jackboot and bayonet has become too great. In the intoxication of victory the Russian system of a bureaucratic oligarchy has proved that it is the enemy of the people. For the Russian is essentially peaceful. No other European nation is as averse to war and everything military as is the Russian nation. Yet the régime which achieved the victory of the Slavs over the West cannot survive without further wars. It has so far deviated from the idea of the fraternity of the poor, the oppressed, the exploited, that even a victory of the Pan-Slav conception and a conquest of

Constantinople must instil into the Russian mind fear and hatred instead of pride. For it no longer would be his victory, the Christian's victory over the unholy West—it would be the victory of the West over the Slav. For Marxism, as it dominates Russia today, is nothing but the conquest of the Russian peasant by an essentially Western idea, the idea of industrialism in its socialist disguise.

This is the point where the Russian problem merges into the European problem of religious revival. What actually is it that is to be revived ? The Church ? Religion ? Man ? The State ? Europe and its civilization ? The answer is : each of these individually and all together, which is tantamount to a revaluation of civilization. Such revaluation of European civilization is a task, the task of giving it a new direction which will enable it to operate.

The directional and functional qualities of our civilization must undergo a fundamental change so as to ensure to man the rights to which he is entitled. Man's basic right is the right to security. This question of man's security within a secure law embraces, and simultaneously reveals, the real problem of our time which has grown torpid within the shackles of mechanization, progress and organization, *i. e.*, of the scientific approach. Time, that archaic metaphor, cloaks something which abruptly renders distinct all that oppresses us : Time, that is the process of production which compels the masses into a clock-ordained existence. It is the striking of the hour, the division between work and leisure, the law that imposes duty and recreation. In other words: The struggle of the religious revivers is directed against the standardization of man's existence according to patterns ; a standardization which is being imposed on the individual from outside, from alien and, as he vaguely feels, hostile forces.

These forces which have set out to impose their standard on all mankind are of a twofold order : They are administrative and para-administrative.

The forces of the executive utilize the para-administrative patterns—press, radio, films, party, sports, sexuality, literature, messianism based on scientific progress, etc.—to facilitate the establishment in power of their own patterns of standardization. These, the patterns of the State proper, are: The Police, the Armed Forces, Bureaucracy, a Classless Society. The intricate interlacing, the deliberately mysterious and completely impenetrable interplay of these modern forces has brought out the hopelessness of the individual and, above all, his insecurity as to his rights.

In large parts of Europe the individual has been deprived of his right to elect the representative of any party other than the party of the government. In the realms of the spiritual, the religious, he has but one recourse : Revolution—a revolution, that is, in the sense of St.

Augustine, aiming at Christian law and a Christian State of Europe.

That messianism which is founded on faith in scientific progress we have to recognize as the most effective means for attaining the standardization or unification of existence in Europe, the means most difficult to pierce and to combat. Yet this religionistic messianism, which repudiates Christ, Doctrine, Church, is essentially agnostic in tendency and attitude. It opposes the religious revival and attacks it as clerical reaction, as a reaction behind which heavy industry, big business and finance take shelter. This, at any rate, is what the German Social Democrats claim; and similarly the Socialists in the other countries. Messianism has become the doctrine of the socialist party-caucuses as, under the influence of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, they have crystallized round the para-administrative patterns of domination over the masses.

Socialism in our age has adjusted itself completely to the methods of the modern, functioning Great Society. Its ideas have submitted to the messianism of its wholly rational ordering of the processes of production and distribution. It lives on the same optimism as the managerial order.

The order into which managers (the works directors) have moulded the modern Mass State avails itself of both administrative and para-administrative means of compulsion, so as to enforce the masses' obedience in the processes of production. The method by which the masses are being deprived of freedom is the method of massification—a slow but irresistible process which calls itself now socialism, now industrial progress, now planning, but is always counter-revolutionary, essentially unchristian and hostile to culture, and is the true characteristic of our age.

From the masses' lack of will, from their stupor, from their massification, arises the modern total state with all its peculiarities of deification. The heresy which has made the scientific miracle the pivot of human existence is the faith of the masses. It is an invention of the West.

Messianism has become the standardized religion of the Western and the Eastern masses and creates the impression of a general or universal civilization.

We are thus faced with a fairly distinct result: the intrusion of standardization into religion leads to spiritual conditions in which nobody can or dares believe anything which is not scientific, modern, progressive. This lack of faith has abandoned the Germans in particular, but also the Russians, to a philosophy which deems the life of the individual as nothing, the life of the State as all. One of the consequences of this philosophy of nihilism is that murder has become a conclusive argument, that the insecurity of the individual within the law has grown into something to be accepted without questioning, something even to be striven after.

The decay of that faith which constitutes the existential essence of the individual, and the decay of individuality have, in the realms of the arts, more especially in the spheres of music, poetry and the theatre, achieved whatever the leaders of the messianic movement dared to hope for.

The massification of the arts keeps step with the massification of the individual. The individuality of the creative artist has been displaced by Hollywood and by that lewd pseudo-romanticism which is standardized for mass consumption, which boosts the mediocre and which is nothing-but-business.

Germany has reached the lowest depths of its existence. So has Europe.

The German masses have a faint inkling of how they have been wronged, of the wrongs they themselves have committed. In dumb agony they roam a land of ruins. In dumb agony they crowd into the ruins of their churches. Mute, because deprived of all freedom, they surrender themselves to a grief which excludes repentance. Repentance presupposes realization and comprehension. How are these men of mass action, of isolated, sub-historical action, to experience repentance when the world of the victors offers them the same spectacle as their own scientific messianism ?

The present state of the German masses compels the realization that Europe must tread a different road if it is to survive. The road of a radical, revolutionary, *i.e.*, liberal, repeal of the mechanistic delusion of the deification of State, Power, Machine, Science. These are elements of the individual's deprivation of freedom. In their interplay they lead to new massification, new enslavement, new wars.

The manifestations of such a repeal, of a Christian revival, are indeed signs of a cultural rebirth. It is clearly directed against the standardization of human existence. European mankind thus opposes the standardization of its religious and ethical ideals. This counter-movement finds its first expression in the field of politics. Europe must find its bearings. It is a vanquished, beleaguered, devastated continent. This the Europeans know. They take up the cross and continue the struggle.

They have realized that "Left" and "Right" are identical. The one and only road, therefore, must be taken which will ensure to the individual, politically and spiritually, the right to European freedom—the Christian road. The shock of war and destruction has interrupted the process of massification and initiated the process of individualization. The simultaneity of this awakening in so many countries permits the conclusion that we stand on the eve of great events. As yet the New Europeans lack their great fervent confessors and missionaries. These, however, will come forth when the hour demands them. Men and slogans of the adversaries, the social-

ists, are outdated, reactionary and hollow. Nobody believes them any more, least of all the youth.

The Continent has not reached the limits of its sufferings yet. But what men feel, begin to feel, is the truth that their agony is a common agony, demanding a common, all-healing solution and redemption. Europe cannot recover unless we regain our Christian tradition which we have ourselves betrayed to the godless and uninspired system of the bureaucrats, the managers of standardization. The outcry of the adversaries, the mass-politicians, shows that the assault has taken them by surprise, and has filled them with fear. The road to enslavement, by way of mechanization of man and his soul, turning it into the mass-soul of mass-men, has proved the wrong road, at the end of which there lies war. The danger has not passed yet. Not by any means. It becomes ever clearer who gambles on war. Now it is up to Europe to show that it has chosen the right road, the road that leads back to the freedom of the individual who refuses to sacrifice his immortal soul once again to the ideals and to the politics of standardization.

The road back leads to the peasant, to the soil, to nature, to the simplicity of life, to the pattern of personality, to the values of a creative life, to creative, non-standardized work. Here, and only here, lies the fundamental conception of the New European Man. This is the road to salvation in the spirit of a religious and cultural revival of Europe—a rebirth without which there cannot and will not be a stable world.

KARL OTTEN

TIMELESS

We say there is no time, no time to love,
To rest or think, no time to dream or pray;
Creation's clock ticks all our lives away;
Swift to its beat the impatient minutes move.
Itinerant moon and whirling globes above
Swing on time's pendulum; the sun each day
Confirms that years and seasons cannot stay:
All hastes, all rushes, down time's iron groove.

There is no time: how strangely true the cry!
For timeless moments light man's common lot:
When the Eternal Presences draw nigh,
Beauty abides, mortality is not,
Sun, moon and stars hang changeless in the sky.....
Then time is dead, discarded and forgot!

EVA MARTIN

SANKARA'S ISVARA AND WHITEHEAD'S GOD

[**Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao,** Lecturer in Philosophy at the Benares Hindu University and the author of *Schools of Vedanta,* compares, in this chapter of his forthcoming book on Whitehead and Śaṅkara, the "super-theism" ascribed to the great Śaṅkarācharya with the God concept of one of the greatest of modern Western philosophers—Alfred North Whitehead. There is an immanent as well as a transcendent aspect of the Deity, as Dr. Nagaraja Rao brings out, though a line must be drawn in thought between the Īśvara of Śaṅkara's metaphysics and the philosophical absurdity of an anthropomorphic God outside his worshippers.—ED.]

Śaṅkara's Īśvara is more philosophically sustained than Whitehead's God, who is not logically adequate. Whitehead's category of Creativity and its relation to the primordial and consequent nature of God are not sustained. Also the functions for which Whitehead evokes his God are not adequately explained by the concept.

Śaṅkara's attempt is more sustained. His God is of a piece with Brahman. There has been some misunderstanding about the genuinely theistic nature of Śaṅkara's thought. His opponents branded him an atheist because their theism was afraid of his metaphysics. The theistic schools of Vedānta that set themselves against Śaṅkara had religion, but no philosophy of religion. They could not understand the grand synthesis of the mastermind. Śaṅkara did not fail to see the strict requirements of metaphysics, nor was he indifferent to the needs of man. Śaṅkara, the poet and the religious prophet, is not fully appreciated. He did not merely formulate a doctrine; he described an experience. We get at a true estimate of the majesty of Śaṅkara's system when we see his synthesis of Brahman and God. He declared: "The reality of the world is Brahman." He held everything to be real in so far as it had Brahman as its locus. "Existence, Knowledge and Love"[1] Śaṅkara held were the contributions of Brahman to the world.

Māyā, the central principle responsible for the diversification of the one Brahman is throughout described as inert. It by itself cannot create the world of space and time. All the beauty, variety and charm of creation are there in Brahman in an unmanifest form. They become operative only when Māyā delimits Brahman. Why it does so, Advaita does not answer.

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[1] Vidyaranya *Drg-drsya Viveka,* 20.

It is further asserted that the principle of Māyā is not eternal, though it is beginningless. It is called the material cause of the world in the sense it undergoes transformation and becomes the various things of the world. But this transformation is not possible without Brahman. It is Brahman that is responsible for the existence, knowledge and pleasure of the objects. Māyā merely gives "name and form." In this sense Brahman too is the material cause of the world. He is the ground for transformation. So in the primary sense, Brahman is the creator of the world.

The scriptures declare that Brahman when delimited by Māyā creates all things. He is called then Īśvara. Śaṅkara in the introductory passage to his commentary on the *Gītā* observes that

the Lord who is in himself the abode of knowledge, might, and power enslaving *Prakṛti* (which has the threefold characteristics), though He himself has no births, is pure and eternal consciousness, he takes as it were the human form and gives birth to himself to protect mankind.

The Īśvara of Śaṅkara does not amuse himself by watching from the wings of the universe the drama of life. Śaṅkara in more than one passage stresses the immanent nature of God. He does not, like Whitehead, make him finite and dependent. Śaṅkara, curiously enough, describes Īśvara as "the only and supreme householder[1] caught in the management of the world. He realises the religious significance and value of the concept of an immanent God. Śaṅkara too, like Whitehead, envisages Brahman under three aspects: God as Wisdom, God as Love, and God as Judge. Professor Radhakrishnan throws out the fruitful suggestion that such a view is strangely reminiscent of the Hindu conception of God as Brahma, Viṣṇu and Śiva.[2] He further interprets the concept of God afresh and brings out the full force of the immanence of God and the organic nature of reality.

The God of religious philosophy cannot be construed merely in terms of wisdom and sovereignty over all. His Creativity and Love cannot be explained except by positing the organic nature of the world process and the immanence of God who is at the heart of the universe, responding to our hopes and sensitive to our wishes. Such a God is the Īśvara of Śaṅkara. In the language of the *Gītā*, He is not only the Lord of Creation seated in the hearts of all but he is the friend and great companion of all.[3] He is not a mere spectator; he shares with man the travail of the world and lightens his burden. We have his presence always with us. He is there to hearten us and strengthen our will. We do not take note of it. He is born as a hero or as an avatāra

[1] Sankara's Commentary on *Vedanta Sutras* I, 1, 5.

[2] *An Idealist View of Life*. By S. RADHAKRISHNAN, pp. 334-5.

[3] *Gita* V, 29.

when there is the need to reproclaim the truth.[1] He reveals himself to his *bhaktas* when they are in a climacteric situation. Our National Poet Tagore improves on this idea :—

> He comes, comes, ever comes
> Every moment and every age, every day and every night he comes, comes, comes, ever comes
> Many a song have I sung in many a mood of mind, but all their notes have always proclaimed, "He comes, comes, ever comes."[2]

The continual presence of God is the key-note of Śaṅkara. He does not stop at this. He goes on to point out the redemptive function of God or Īśvara as the guide of the soul. Worship of Īśvara gives the necessary cleansing to the mind, without which we cannot realise the fundamental oneness of reality and have genuine fellow-feeling. After the expiation of all evils, physical and psychological, the individual soul becomes Īśvara. But so long as there is even one soul in bondage Īśvara will be in bondage. He does not lapse into Brahman until all are saved. He has a definite function while the process lasts. He is there "till the last atom of dust is consumed into the glory of the Lord." Whitehead's God can perform none of these functions.

Śaṅkara's theism is a part of his metaphysics. It is a full-fledged philosophy of religion. The absolute idealism of Śaṅkara is not blind to the defects and the merits of the concept of an immanent God. He makes an extensive use of the concept in a qualified manner. He does not make God a finite struggling individual perfecting himself. He represents him as helping others to perfect themselves in the art of soul-making. Further, Śaṅkara makes it clear that the moral effort of man is as necessary as God's co-operation in the art of life. "Religion has no secret which absolves us from living."[3]

On the metaphysical side Śaṅkara does not posit his Īśvara as a second principle in addition to Brahman. The organic connection between Brahman and Īśvara is very clear. It is not unintelligible like the relation envisaged by Whitehead between Creativity and the primordial and the consequent nature of God. The Creativity of Whitehead is pure indetermination without any character of its own. Creativity is turned into determinate freedom, how, we do not know. It cannot be due to God, for the simple reason that God is one of the accidents of Creativity. God cannot be at the same time the accident and the source of the accidents.

Śaṅkara conceives the ultimate nature of Brahman on a more satisfactory basis, in terms of Consciousness, Bliss and Knowledge.[4] With the principle of Māyā delimiting Brahman Śaṅkara viewed Brah-

[1] *Gita* IV, 7 and 8.
[2] *Gitanjali*, v. 45.
[3] *Eastern Religions and Western Thought.* By S. RADHAKRISHNAN, p. 101.
[4] *Vide An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 329-30.

man from two points of view: the cosmic and the Absolute. The Absolute is at once "the sum and the source of limitless possibilities." One of the possibilities is being actualised in the cosmic process. God is the supreme from the cosmic end. He is not deluded by Māyā, but he enslaves Māyā and undertakes creation. He himself enters into every object and sustains it and gives it existence. The *Chāndogya* points out that Īśvara enters the living self of all (*jīvātma*) and appears under different forms. There are no two or multiples of Brahman as the critics of Śaṅkara suppose.[1] It is Brahman that gives reality and existence to the whole world. Śaṅkara, while commenting on the above-mentioned passage, observes :—

The whole multiplicity of creatures existing under name and form in so far as it has the Supreme Being itself for its essence is true, if regarded as self-dependent is untrue.[2]

Śaṅkara nowhere denies the need for Īśvara. Before adverting to the different views of Īśvara among Advaita thinkers it must be admitted that none of them regard the personal God as a figment of imagination or as a metaphysical superfluity. They all insist that worship of Īśvara is absolutely necessary for salvation. It is a step which we cannot jump over. In Advaita, the place of God is not unstable. He is a definite aspect of the central metaphysical entity Brahman. He has functions which answer to the religious needs of man and at the same time satisfy the metaphysical requirements. God is integral to Śaṅkara's philosophy of religion. God is not a mere appearance of the absolute. He is "the absolute in the world-context."[3]

Thus we see that God has a logical place in Advaita. It answers definite needs and has a foundation in reality.

The necessity for an Īśvara on the rational side is also argued in Advaita. Apart from scriptural evidence, the Advaitin points out that the universe cannot be the creation of the individual souls. They have neither the capacity nor the wisdom for it. If they had they would not be so miserable and helpless. This world of ours has to be accounted for. Māyā by itself cannot create it, for it has not in it the potentiality of the wealth and charm of Creation. Māyā associates with Brahman and becomes his instrument and then we have Creation. At this stage, we call the Absolute of philosophy, the God of religion. The world of common intercourse were not possible but for God. No doubt it may be urged

[1] *Vide Mysticism East and West.* By R. Otto, p. 14. The personal God of India, Isvara, issues from the Brahman simultaneously with the atman, the soul, and both appear together as simultaneously and mutually determined occurrences. It is the same in Eckhart's teaching. Only with and for the soul, with and for the creature, is God, God as person, as subject, and as conscious of objects.

[2] Sankara on *Chandogya*, VI. 3, 2.

[3] *Contemporary Indian Philosophy.* By S. Radhakrishnan, p. 282.

that the explanation that spirit is the creator of the world is a poor one. But the explanations for the origination of the universe, as the result of a fortuitous concourse of primal atoms, or as the spontaneous evolution of nature, with a God at the end, or the explanation that a certain vital force gave rise to it, are less satisfactory and enfeeble moral effort.

The Advaitin does not reject the spirit as the cause of the world nor does he stop there. From the spirit as cause it is easier for him to pass on to Brahman which is neither cause nor effect. In the words of the late Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri :—

Reality is not less but more than God; not by eschewing God, but by realising and transcending Him, can we realise the self; for the world is God-dependent; and to ignore God may well lead to the world asserting itself as if independent, and weighing us down, as in samsāra; release requires therefore the realisation first of the dependence of the world on God, and then of God being an appearance of Brahman.[1]

There are two methods in Advaita tradition with the help of which the relation between Brahman and Īśvara is explained.[2] The first is called the *avaccheda* doctrine. It is associated with the name of the greatest commentator of Śaṅkara, Vācaspati. This view explains the relation between Brahman and Īśvara on the analogy of space and its limitations. Ether is infinite and all-pervasive; but at the same time it is found in the pot, in the room etc. In the same manner Brahman delimited by internal organs is the soul (jīva). The process of delimiting is bipolar. The locus of nescience (Māyā) for Vācaspati is the individual soul, but the content of the nescience is Brahman. At one pole there is Īśvara and at the other there is the individual soul. According to this view there is a plurality of nescience.

The second theory is called the Reflection or *Pratibiṁba* Theory. According to that view Brahman is reflected in Māyā and that reflection is Īśvara, and Brahman reflected in Avidya is called Jīva. Others hold the view that Īśvara is only the prototype and the other souls are his reflections. There is a good deal of difference of opinion amongst Advaita thinkers on the technical relation of these terms. But all are agreed as to the organic nature of Brahman and Īśvara. The God of Advaita is not a second principle nor is it an abstraction, but Brahman itself. Thus we see that Śaṅkara's theism is not a concession to the masses, but an absolutely necessary step for all in the art of self-realisation. We have also seen how Śaṅkara's theory is not surely atheism, but rather the logical perfection of the theistic faith. Indeed, whereas atheism believes only in the world and

[1] *Sankaracharya.* By S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, pp. 96-7.

[2] *Vide* Appayya Diksit's *Siddhantalesasangraha* for the various views. Kumbakonam Edition, pp. 66-104.

not at all in God, and ordinary Theism believes in both, the world and God, Śaṅkara believes only in God. For him God is the only Reality. Rather than denying God, he makes the most of God. This view also makes the highest extension of the ordinary religious emotion towards God. For it points to the stage where love of God becomes absolute, suffering neither the ego nor the world. If this type of faith is to be distinguished from ordinary theism (or belief in a personal God) the word for it should be, not atheism but *super-theism.*[1]

Whitehead's God is neither of a piece with Creativity, nor does he satisfy the religious requirements. Two steps on the metaphysical path would lead Whitehead to Śaṅkara. From organism it is one step ahead to the concept of Personality; from Personality it is another to Spiritual Consciousness.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

WHAT IS RATIONALISM?

Gerald Bullett in *The Literary Guide* for October asks himself "Am I a Rationalist?" He prefaces his remarks by a reference to the prayers for fair weather just ordered by the Archbishop of York to be said in English churches, drawing the obvious deductions that God's vanity requires appeasing or that His knowledge is defective. He remarks that the intellectuals in the church do not believe in such a God. Why, then, do they ordain such idle prayers, unless to focus attention on the fact that rain and sunshine are beyond man's control? And "Why bring God into the picture in such a way as to belittle Him (or It)?" he asks.

He rejects Rationalism as officially defined: "The mental attitude which unreservedly accepts the supremacy of reason," finding it inadequate. There are higher promptings in man's heart, *e. g.*, to self-sacrifice, which are not rational. The definition goes on to reject "arbitrary assumptions" and "authority." Believers, he says, will scarcely admit that their particular assumptions are arbitrary, and the rejection of "authority" is also claimed by many religionists.

> Is Rationalism, therefore, anything more than the affirmation of the right and duty of private judgment? Is there any difference, in principle, between the Rationalist who accepts the supremacy of (his own) reason and the Quaker who follows his inner light?

On the other hand,

> If it means Atheism, if it means nineteenth-century Materialism...if its aim is to make a god of Physical Science, and in the name of that authority to reject every philosophical speculation out of hand, let that policy be plainly declared....As for the pretence that Rationalists have a monopoly of rationality, that is neither good sense nor good manners.

This is a plain challenge to the whole Rationalist position and it is good that *The Literary Guide* should publish it. In Mr. Bullett's opinion the term Rationalism has outlived its usefulness. We await with interest the outcome of the challenge.

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[1] *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy.* By DRS. CHATTERJEE and DATTA. Second Edition, 1944, p. 450.

IQBAL'S GHAZALS

[**Ahmed G. Chagla** has been a successful interpreter of the ancient and medieval thought of Islam to the modern enquirer. In this short article he translates four *ghazals* of the well-known Muslim poet Iqbal.—ED.]

The late Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938) has been called a philosopher-poet. That is only partly correct. From the second half of his middle period onwards he may very well be called a mystic poet as well, in the truest sense of that much-misused term. In his later days Iqbal ceased to write long didactic poems of the type of "Complaint" and "Reply to Complaint" which had made him famous earlier. At this period he no more reasons like a philosopher, suspecting all authority in the spirit of philosophy, which is that of free inquiry. He transcends the intellect and enters the domain of faith.

He now frankly recognises the incapacity of reason to reach the ultimate Reality, for, he says :—

With (the help of) intellect the wayfarer gains sight (of the way):
What is intellect? It is but a lamp on the highway:
(But) What (actually) is happening *within* the Abode?
What knowledge does the wayside lamp possess of that?

And so he turns to faith—*imān*—which is the essence of religion. Iqbal says

...faith like the bird sees its "trackless way" unattended by intellect which, in the words of the great mystic poet of Islam (Rumi), "only waylays the living heart of man and robs it of its invisible wealth of life that lies within."

Iqbal says in another place :—

Beyond the limits of (scientific) knowledge, for the man of faith (*mu'min*),
There is savour of eager desire and the (Divine) favour of sight (of the Beloved).

It is to this period, which may be called the period of faith, in the evolution of Iqbal, the man and the poet, that most of his famous ghazals belong. Iqbal's conception of faith is of interest. He says :—

Faith is more than mere feeling. It has something like a cognitive content, and the existence of rival parties—scholastics and mystics—in the history of religion shows that idea is a vital element in religion.

What, then, is religion? Quoting a modern European thinker, Iqbal writes :—

Religion on its doctrinal side, as defined by Professor Whitehead, is "a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended."

Iqbal's apprehension of these "general truths" was vivid and sincere to the degree of transforming his character. This cannot be doubted.

Like another great philosopher-poet of Hindustan, Ghalib, Iqbal

composed ghazals both in Persian and in Urdu. Again as in the case of Ghalib, it is Iqbal's Urdu ghazals that have attained to an unrivalled popularity today, although, like Ghalib, Iqbal valued more highly his Persian poems, the intrinsic worth of which remains high. Except that Iqbal seldom places his name in the last couplet, or anywhere else in the ghazal, his technique follows the well-known forms of Persian poetry. But not so his subjects. Iqbal stands unique in the selection of themes for his ghazals. In these the deep self-forgetfulness of Hafiz, the nihilism of Omar Khayyam, the *gul* (rose) and *bulbul* (nightingale) sentimentalism of Persian and Urdu poets are all conspicuous by their absence. In their place we find vigour, freshness of subject and expression, boldness and deep emotional insight—the kind of emotional insight that has a definite cognitive content. Iqbal is nothing if not positive, frank, hopeful and spontaneous. It is only in Ghalib that one finds most, but not all, of these qualities. One may consider it a portentous sign of the times that Iqbal is not only so well appreciated but is actually being imitated in thought and expression by our younger poets today.

In a free prose rendering of a poem which is also a translation into another language it is impossible to convey all the delicate shades of meaning and feeling of the original. The following prose rendering of four of Iqbal's Urdu ghazals from his *Bal-e-Jibril* are presented only with a view to giving some inkling of the poet's feelings and thoughts to those unacquainted with his original works. These ghazals belong to his later middle period and may be taken as illustrations of one aspect of the mature Iqbal and the universality of his message. The philosophic undercurrent in them all is worthy of notice.

(I)

"Jab ishq sikhātā hai ādābe khud āgāhi"

(Only) When love teaches the etiquette of self-knowledge,
Are the Imperial Mysteries revealed to the slaves!

Whether it be Attar or Rumi, Razi or Ghazzali,
Nothing comes to hand without supplication in the early dawn!

Do not lose hope in them, O wise guide!
Even though the wayfarers are slow-moving,
They are not without zeal (to reach the goal)!

O bird of the Divine Regions! Death is better for you than that bread—
The bread which may hinder you from soaring (to heavenly heights)!

That *faqir* is better than Darius or Alexander
In whose poverty is the fragrance of (the self-imposed poverty of Ali) the "Lion of God"!

The law of brave men is truth-telling and fearlessness:
The lions of God know not foxiness!

(II)

"Sitāron se āge jahān aur bhi hain"

Beyond the stars are yet other worlds:
There are yet more trials of love ahead!
These extensive vistas do not exist in the void of lower life:
There are hundreds of other caravans here!

Do not be content with this world of colour and scent:
There are yet other gardens; other nests!

Why grieve if this one nest be lost?
There are yet more places for clamour and complaint!

You are the royal falcon; soaring is your pursuit:
Before you, are yet other firmaments (to soar up to)!

Do not lose yourself by being enmeshed in this day and night (*i.e.*, in serial time):
You have yet another Time (as pure Duration) and yet other spaces (to conquer)!

The days are gone when I was alone in this gathering:
Now here I have confidants as well!

(III)

"Gesooe tābdār ko aur bhi tābdār kar!"

(Beloved!)
Render Thy lustrous tresses even more lustrous!
Capture my sense, my intellect!
Capture my heart!
Capture my sight!

Let love be veiled;
Let Beauty also be veiled:
Either reveal Thou Thine Own Self,
Or make Thou me manifest!

Thou art the Boundless Ocean!
I am but a tiny stream:
Either lead Thou me to Thine own shore
Or else make Thou me Shoreless!

If I am a full shell (containing a pearl)
The lustre (and renown) of my pearl is in Thy hands!
But if I am only an empty shell
Then transform Thou me into a priceless gem.

If the (full-throated) song of
New Spring is not in my destiny
Form Thou this half-consuming breath of mine into (the warbling of) a little (early) spring bird.

Why (Oh, why!) didst Thou command me to go a-journeying from the Garden?
The work of the world is long (and arduous):
Now waitest Thou for my return!

When on the Day of Judgment the account of my work (in the world) is presented:
Be *Thou* ashamed of it!
Also make Thou me ashamed!

(IV)

"Yoon hāth nahin ātā wo gohare Yakdānā"

That One and only (Priceless) Pearl cannot be acquired without effort:
(Then—) One-pointedness and freedom (in your effort), O manly resolve!

(Choose Thou!—)
Either a Tughral's or a (Sultan) Sanjar's way of world conquest:
Or else the (nonconformist faqir) *qalandar's* rank of kingly power!

Either the astonishment (and stupefaction) of (the philosopher) (Al) Farabi:
Or else the restlessness of spirit of (the mystic) Rumi;
Either philosophic thought
Or else the self-absorption of Abraham (who threw himself into fire with firm faith in God).

Either the foxiness of intellect
Or else the love of (Ali) the "Hand of God";
Either the (futile) stratagems and tricks of the Europeans,
Or else the (one-pointed) onslaught of the Turks!

Either the (equitable) Way of Islam
Or keeping the door of a (false) temple;
Or else an intoxicated shout—
Whether it be the Ka'ba or the idol-house!

Whether in the kingly state or in the state of a (poverty-stricken) faqir—
Nothing can be acquired without the daring of the intoxicated.

A. G. CHAGLA

EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

[It is of value as well as of interest to see world problems through the eyes of the generation now on the threshold of adult responsibility, to whom their elders must look to help them straighten out the mess which they have made of things. A member of that generation, **Shri Kanishka H. Kaji, LL.B.,** offers here some pertinent reflections on a vital theme.—ED.]

Unfortunately there is no agreement among the nations as to the ultimate aim of education. There can never be any lasting and real agreement between those who believe in the overwhelming supremacy of the State over the individual and who pin their faith on the material advancement of their own nation, and those who have faith in the essential goodness of Man and in the supreme importance of freedom for self-expression and self-realisation and of equality of opportunity for all. It is this cleavage which makes intellectual conflicts and wars inevitable.

Essentially, education is not a mere imparting of knowledge or the training of the mental faculties. In the West undue emphasis on these aspects has led to unintegrated and divided lives. The Fascist governments laid the emphasis on body building and it is true that no country can rise above the health and vigour of its people. Eastern countries have had a culture which has laid emphasis on moral development. Thus, in the words of Madame Sophia Wadia :—

A constant war is going on between the hands—the instruments of action, the head—the instrument of thought, and the heart—the instrument of feeling.

The first aim of education is to harmonise the distracting tendencies within the human being, to form the discordant notes, which weaken concerted human action, into a divine symphony. The second aim of education should be to train men and women not to be parasites on the community but to serve suffering humanity in and through their lives. The aim should not be to teach men "to get on in life" and "to be on top" at the cost of others. Madame Sophia Wadia has rightly said :—

Right livelihood is the apex of the divine triangle ; from that point proceed two lines, one is self-education, the other is self-discipline, and the two are connected at the base by the third line —service to humanity.

The true function of education is thus threefold: (1) Imparting strength and vigour to the body; (2) developing the intellect, storing the mind with knowledge and training the mental faculties ; and (3) inculcating moral sentiments, educating the conscience, and leading the affections through proper channels to good-will towards all. Unless a

vigorous body responds to a trained mind and unless the heart beats in unison with the mind there will be no complete man fit to play his part and fulfil his mission in life.

Sadly, however, the world today is in a turmoil. The present age is one of perplexing contradictions: the co-existence of scarcity and abundance, and of ever-increasing technical knowledge and skill with the stunting of human wisdom, are leading man on perhaps to a new Dark Age. The world is suffering from exhaustion. The various nations are torn between the rival pulls of various social and political philosophers. There is no unifying force capable of holding the divergent nations together. The peoples of the world are vaguely dreaming of a new world order, based not on exploitation of the weaker nations by the strong, but on justice and fair-play. Millions have died in this war in the forlorn hope that out of the holocaust of Armageddon, the world might emerge purified of its glaring inequalities. World charters were dangled before the people so that they might whole-heartedly co-operate in the war. But since the coming of peace, the governments have turned a deaf ear to reminders of their war-time promises. The people have been robbed of the fruits of victory, fruits in terms not of territorial aggrandisement or economic exploitation but of a better and more peaceful world, living in amity. A complete metamorphosis is the only hope. The question is: Can the democracies discover within themselves a way of economic, political and moral salvation which will be an effective answer to the challenge of the reactionary forces of Fascism and its ideological successors?

The world is in need of a new set of ideals, of moral and intellectual regeneration. We have to educate the world for democracy. But what is democracy? Is it a form of government in which every individual is, as a matter of law, equal and free to exercise his rights? Is it a dogma which allows unrestricted economic individualism and commercial exploitation under the garb of individual freedom of action? Rightly understood, democracy is an all-pervading principle. Its domain extends over politics and economics as well as over the cultural and moral spheres. It is a philosophy covering the whole of human relations—personal and collective. By its very nature it cannot be rigid but is flexible to changing demands.

Firstly, in the political sphere. Negatively, democracy is pledged to protect individual liberty of thought and action. But its positive rôle is to create new opportunities for self-development, to extend educational training and to establish a high level of material welfare. Democracy lodges sovereignty with the whole people, as no single person or group can be trusted to interpret faithfully the welfare of all. Public policy arises as the expression of the common will, the majority decision,

if not unjust, being translated into law.

Secondly, in the economic sphere. Following its main principle of individual liberty of action, democracy prescribes no specific form of economy, but provides that operations be conducted not as ends in themselves but as means of advancing individual and collective welfare. With the advent of large-scale industry in the nineteenth century, economic individualism and democratic principles of political and social equality often clashed, resulting in the consistent victory of the democratic principles. There has come an increasing realisation that mere political equality unaccompanied by economic security and social equality is a mockery of true democratic principles, that economic slavery and real equality of opportunity do not go together. Today the state is, in consequence, increasingly interfering in the domain of private enterprise when the interest of the whole community so demands.

Thirdly, in the social and cultural spheres. At the basis of democracy lies its deep respect for the human personality, a respect extended impartially to every member of society. It concedes the right of self-realisation, irrespective of class or religious distinctions. The institution of democracy aims at giving equal opportunity to all for self-development.

Fourthly, in the spiritual sphere. Democracy is a spiritual institution, like religion, and the attempt to give it a materialistic form exerts a dangerous corrupting influence. Differences exist in the natural kingdoms as well as in the human. But these take on a new meaning when viewed from a spiritual angle. Each human being, though his capacity and his character are different from those of others, is fulfilling his appointed mission and all are of equal value and importance. Democracy is a way of life, a code of morality to be followed in everyday life in the social and ethical spheres as in business and politics. It does not advocate absolute equality in the economic field as does Communism; it guarantees equality of opportunity, freedom of self-expression and for self-realisation.

Democracy, having these connotations, demands a system of education suited to its requirements. Education for democracy should have a fivefold emphasis: (1) Independent thinking; (2) dignity of labour; (3) international co-operation; (4) affinity of nations rather than divergences; and (5) art and culture.

Independent thinking. War has corrupted many things. One of them is intellectual honesty. We have lost the habit of thinking calmly and with originality, without preconceived notions and prejudices. Originality of thought is the first essential for the successful operation of the democratic principle. The hope of the world lies in people who read and think, who preserve the right to take the initiative for

themselves and who refuse to be guided blindly or by anything except their educated conscience.

The dignity of labour. Aristocracy in Democracy is in terms of character and service. In the intellectual and spiritual sphere, democracy raises all honourable human endeavour to equality. No work which is done honestly and justly can be degrading. Conversely, every citizen must feel that he is engaged in noble work or else he is not likely to render efficient service. The value and dignity of work ultimately depend not on the wages but on the worth of the product and its contribution towards the progressive realisation by the people of the good and happy life.

International co-operation. We are on the brink of an international government. The dark and fearful night of political rivalries and of economic exploitation of weaker nations is nearing its end. This decade may see the dawn of a new era in international relationships if our energies are co-ordinated towards one common goal. Today the raw material for the "one world" ideal exists. The galloping advance of scientific invention has brought us closer than ever before. Today the nations are interdependent for their political betterment and economic well-being. No nation can hereafter isolate itself. The raw material of the "one world" ideal must become a psychological unity, a spiritual concord. Narrow nationalism has led us twice in this century to fearful catastrophes. We have to reshape human ideals. It will not do merely to denounce war while acquiescing in the mechanism of contemporary society, in the competitive instead of the co-operative way of life.

Affinity of nations, not divergences. National and class divisions, racial and religious cleavages are poisonous parasites on the tree of human nature. The diverse educational institutions should lay predominant emphasis on the great affinity between the peoples of various nations, their customs and their ideologies, rather than on divergences, past rivalries and mutual distrust.

Study of art and culture should predominate in the teaching of history rather than political and economic rivalries. The common man should be the ruling theme. History is today a chronicle of wars and of the reigns of kings and queens. It rarely touches the progress achieved by the masses in art and culture. Wars in the past did not very much affect the commercial and cultural intercourse between the peoples. The supremacy of one nation over another is measurable by the degree to which art and culture have permeated the national life and not by territorial expansion or material riches. Only such a study on an international plane can bring out the respective contributions of nations, small or great, towards the common enrichment of the world.

In the new world organisation, the Economic and Social Council is

assigned the task of reinforcing peace in the cultural and spiritual spheres and the means proposed are "International co-operation in Education and furtherance of cultural intercourse in the Arts, Humanities and Sciences." The practical outcome of this clause should be the establishment of an International University for the study of various sciences with an international background. The men at the top should be men of international breadth of vision, of stern character and practical idealism. The nation-states should be allotted a proportionate number of seats at the university and encouraged to send their best men to it and then to afford them opportunities to translate their theoretical knowledge into practical usefulness in their nation-states.

Let us realise that democracy is not only a political philosophy but also fundamentally a practical religion. Today our indifference towards religion is veiled in the gilded cloak of tolerance. For us religion has become a pompous nothing, a gorgeously dressed corpse, without energy to vitalise our life and spiritualise our daily activities. For successful operation, the democratic principle should have its basis in a religion not of Sunday worship or empty ceremonial, but of abundant vitality to regenerate our lives. We should cease to regard the moral life as a water-tight compartment of the personality. Religion permeates even the rock of politics, and, as Mahatma Gandhi says,

> There is no politics devoid of religion. Politics without religion is a death trap because it kills the soul.

We must instil in our hearts, recognise in thought and translate into action the irrefutable truths of all true religions—the essential equality of Man, faith in Divine Justice, and Universal Brotherhood. If we know the difference between right and wrong, we can never say, let us do evil, so that good may come; let us have wars, so that peace may ensue.

KANISHKA H. KAJI

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

SHAW'S "INTIMIDATING VERSATILITY" *

This is a symposium in celebration of Bernard Shaw's ninetieth birthday. It contains twenty-eight contributions ranging from short letters to long essays, some new portraits and sketches by Clare Winsten, and some photographs not hitherto published. One of the ever freshly delightful things about Shaw is that his personal appearance at all stages of his career has been equal to his unexampled performance, and his performance to that striking appearance. A strong body is a very important item in an author's equipment. I have always been struck by the sturdiness of Shaw's physique. There are a lot of Dublin policemen who look just like that in a way. It is one of the reasons why he has been able to last out so long.

The reader of this book will be immediately struck by the intimidating versatility of this man. For when we have added to his main work as dramatist his work as dramatic and *acting* critic, social critic, education critic, and science critic, we have to consider him in the light of a world-affairs commentator, a creative economist, a philosopher and a theologian, after which we are called upon to appraise him as a radio expert and adviser, a scenario writer, a public speaker, and a marvellous actor off stage, which, so far from exhausting his activities, leads us to the undoubted fact that his practical and legal work on nearly a hundred committees would have been enough for any one man, while in abundance and quality as a letter writer he is the greatest of all time.

It is queer to think how he was granted no channel until after forty, and that he himself had no literary ambitions, wishing he could be an opera singer or a painter. But once this Force was unleashed, it is now clear to us how no opposition could do anything to stop it. In the end it is impossible to think of any other writer who has had such a prodigious effect upon the thought of his age. "I cannot think of anybody whose non-existence would have made a more profound intellectual difference to this transitional age of ours" than G. B. S., says Mr. Laurence Housman. Even the scientist in this volume, Professor Bernal, writes "We are all of us Shaw's pupils, no less the scientist than the playwright and the politician."

The contributions bring this out fairly well. There remains the chief fact that he is a dramatist of world reputation—which makes an essay called "Shaw as Dramatist" seem somewhat out of proportion. Nor can it fairly be said that James Bridie makes a good job of it—in fact when he is not being whimsical he spends his space mostly on Molière and not on Shaw. But everyone familiar with Shaw's works must applaud Bridie's remark, "I have no patience

* *G. B. S. 90: Aspects of Bernard Shaw's Life and Work.* Edited by S. WINSTEN. (Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers), Ltd., London. 21s.)

with people who say that Shaw can only create walking gramophones." We have heard too much of that from people with only one record. Also it is time some one said as Bridie does—"In subject alone no other dramatist has ever had such a range with the possible exception of Shakespeare." He did quite a different thing than Shakespeare, but on a similar scale and, it will be found, with similar power to endure.

Dr. Joad gives a summary of the well-known creative evolution theory. In the main he warmly approves and observes that Shaw's claims as a philosopher have been played down because of his eminence in so many fields. Having said that, he then adds that serious criticism would advance one or two complaints. It would say, for instance, that Shaw's view of Matter as Life's *enemy* is very unsatisfactory. It is indeed! It is so unconceived by its author that it is worse than useless as a conception for anyone else—even if we had the least idea what Matter *is*. Secondly, Dr. Joad reminds us that the ultimate aim of Shaw's Ancients is the contemplation of—*nothing*. It comes to that. And it is the very opposite to a true mysticism which is not the rejection but the acceptance of the actual, the real, and the transmutation of it by the power of the Imagination. To praise Shaw's philosophy and then completely damn it in this manner is rather like saying—"Here is a splendid horse, which should go in for the Derby, though actually it happens to be blind in one eye and lame in two legs."

Dean Inge contributes an essay on Theology with an occasional allusion to Shaw. It is well worth reading. After dismissing Jesus as irrelevant to the core of religion, and reminding us that religious experience is the essential thing, he makes the following excellent observation—"It is nonsense to say that these experiences, not being transferable, are of no value as evidence. If a dozen honest men tell me that they have climbed the Matterhorn, I am satisfied that the summit of that mountain is accessible, though I shall never get there myself." But he fails to point out—as was clearly his business here—that the whole case against Shaw as philosopher and metaphysician lies in the fact that he has shown no appreciation of the truth that the Higher Consciousness has *already* been reached from time to time by means utterly other than curious eugenics, longer life, or redemption from the flesh.

But the most important thing about this book lies in the fact that all men who have had anything to do with Shaw personally make, without a single exception, expressions of love for him. That is one great central thing about this marvellous man.

JOHN STEWART COLLIS

Letters from John Chinaman and Other Essays. By G. LOWES DICKINSON. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

When Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson died in 1932 at the age of seventy, he was known to the world of letters as a high-souled philosopher and a clear-eyed prophet of internationalism. He visioned the unity of the human race, but saw about him only division, discord, anarchy. He loved his country,

but intensely disliked several aspects of its political and social philosophy in action. He helped men like E. M. Forster, John Maynard Keynes and Lytton Strachey to realize in their different ways their unique vocations in life or letters; and, indeed, for a whole generation he was symbolic of all that was best in Cambridge. For a man of his leisure and learning, his publications were few—"few, but roses"!

England's ignoble intervention in China cut him deeply, and he wrote in 1901 the justly famous *Letters from John Chinaman*, a book that by sleight-of-hand exposed rather the tragic limitations of the European, especially English, way of life. In the group of essays "Religion: A Criticism and a Forecast," originally published in 1905, Dickinson discussed the problems of faith and revelation from the standpoint of "active expectancy"—the attitude of a man "who, while candidly recognizing that he does not know, and faithfully pursuing or awaiting knowledge, and ready to accept it when it comes, yet centres meantime his emotional, and therefore his practical life about a possibility which he selects because of its value, its desirability." Dickinson was eager to invade the Invisible—but the spirit of Reason, albeit it is a charming and chastened mistress with him, stopped him at the furthest threshold of Reality, denying him both the Vision and the Felicity. Another group of essays, "Religion and Immortality" (1911), reared on a like attitude of "active expectancy," explained Dickinson's seasoned views on optimism, progress and immortality. At the end of the road Dickinson found it possible, if not to see the god, at least to hear the music, and, if only for a fleeting transcendent second, to front "the sun and the new world." Next year Dickinson published his *Essay on the Civilizations of India, China and Japan*, and, although there was a good deal in the essay, particularly in the section devoted to India, that seemed superficial and even misleading, there was no question about Dickinson's earnestness or integrity. He began with the generalization: "I conceive the dominant note of India to be religion; of China, humanity; of Japan, chivalry." In the ensuing discussion it was clear that Dickinson, in spite of his desire to understand all, was least at home in India, and most in China. But, after all, to Dickinson the author of the classic *The Greek View of Life*, ancient Hellas was the spring of all that was genuine and undefiled in European civilization. In his lecture on the "Contribution of Ancient Greece to Modern Life," delivered in the year of his death in his own university, he suggested in the course of a few luminous pages—luminous with the after-glow of the setting sun—his life-long enthusiasm for Greek literature and thought. All these "minor" works of this modern rishi, this "saint of internationalism" as Mr. Frank Kendon calls him, garnered from a harvest of over thirty years, are now reissued in one handy volume, with a brief Introduction by Mr. E. M. Forster—an Introduction that introduces as well his own meritorious biography of "the best man who ever lived."

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. (Nisbet and Co., Ltd., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Although to me this book has been uphill reading, I recognise that the thought in it is careful, strong and unhysterical. The author, an American, has a German style. In 128 pages he does not use a single "concrete" word, and it is this unrelieved use of abstract phrases which makes the book tough to those who think naturally in images. Anyone who can read metaphysics or economics with pleasure would probably sail through Dr. Niebuhr's pages.

The Children of Darkness are those who, like the Nazis, desire to abolish freedom for the sake of obtaining orderliness. The Children of Light are those who stand for freedom. Simple enough, you may say, but our author proceeds to the idea that the Children of Darkness have cynicism as their chief characteristic, so that, fully acknowledging the "original sin" in man, his greed, envy and egotism, they astutely make use of these factors; whereas the Children of Light are nearly always more or less sentimental and deny that the evil in man is incurable and must ruin their utopias and world associations.

He has no faith in any attempt to achieve a final solution of society's problems. He writes:—

> The materialist conception of human consciousness in Marxist theory obscures both the creative and destructive transcendence of individual consciousness over any and every social and historical concretion of life. Life requires a more organic and mutual form than bourgeois democratic theory provides for it; but the social substance of life is richer and more various, and has greater depths and tensions, than are envisaged in the Marxist dream of social harmony.

In criticism of the idealists he says that Hegel's "error is very similar to that of Fichte's and of all the universalists, whether naturalistic or idealistic, positivist or romantic." Again, he illustrates the natural corruption of man with these words: "A new oligarchy is arising in Russia, the spiritual characteristics of which can hardly be distinguished from those of the American "go-getters" of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And in the light of history Stalin will probably have the same relation to the early dreamers of the Marxist dreams which Napoleon has to the liberal dreamers of the eighteenth century." His definition of evil might be put forward by a Buddhist:—

> Evil is always the assertion of some self-interest without regard to the whole, whether the whole be conceived as the immediate community, or the total community of mankind, or the total order of the world. The good is, on the other hand, always the harmony of the whole on various levels.

Dr. Niebuhr is doubtful whether a world-order can be attained. "If," he says, "it is within the possibilities, only desperate necessity makes it so. Yet we may be sure that ages of tragic history will be required to achieve what is so impossible and yet so necessary." At the end of the book he suggests, rather surprisingly, that a recognition of Christ and of a superhuman interest in humanity's affairs may save us from ultimate disaster. "The hope of Christian faith," he says, "that the Divine Power which bears history can complete what even the highest human striving must leave incomplete, and can purify the corruptions which appear in even the purest human aspirations, is an indispensable pre-requisite for diligent fulfilment of our historic tasks."

CLIFFORD BAX

The Career of Victor Hugo. By ELLIOTT M. GRANT. (Harvard University Press. $3.50; Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. 20*s*.)

"I have sought to compile a book which, if not completely original, would at least have the merit of being useful," writes Mr. Grant in his preface. This ambition—no mean one for a text-book—he has attained: the work is clear, balanced and fully documented. The large contours of this remarkable man are boldly sketched: he who ate "incredible meals, sometimes consuming a lobster (including the shell) and winding up with four or five oranges, skins and all," grasped the universe with giant hands, manipulating his cosmic material into poem, play or novel; transforming it, if not with the alchemy of a Shakespeare, at least with a skill of grandeur, consciously sublime. His range was enormous; from the tender lyric to witty satire, and through melodrama and the macabre to the height of the poem, unpublished during his lifetime, "Dieu." "*Dieu, c'est le grand réel et le grand inconnu....*"

To the English ordinary reader Victor Hugo is best known as the author of *Les Misérables* and *Notre-Dame de Paris,* novels of rich drama, of stirring melodrama and magnificent description: both have the flavour of historic Paris, both are good stories with a breathless quality of excitement. Next in familiarity, perhaps, is the play *Hernani* so often studied in school; that challenge to the pseudo-classic drama of the eighteenth century where elegant periphrasis and a rigid metre-form delighted men with what they had known for years. Hugo let loose a revolutionary wind, putting "*un bonnet rouge au vieux dictionnaire.*"

J'ai dit a la narine: Eh mais! tu n'es qu'un nez!
J'ai dit au long fruit d'or: Mais tu n'es qu'une poire!

In other words, he called a poetic spade a spade—not an agricultural implement.

This great figure, symbol of flux, of change after the Revolution, worshipped power in Napoleon but hated tyranny. Under "Napoleon-le-petit" he went into exile on our own territory, the Channel Islands, enriching his muse there by contemplation, by commune with wild nature, with the awful sea pounding their shores: we may therefore claim in some measure a part of his inspiration. This is, to use the word in an unusual sense, poetic justice, since it is Victor Hugo as French poet who perhaps falls the most naturally, the most understandably, on English ears.

DOROTHY HEWLETT

India: A Plea for Understanding; The Moral Challenge of Gandhi. By DOROTHY HOGG. (Kitab Mahal, 56-A, Zero Road, Allahabad. Rs. 3/- and As. 8, respectively)

The author of these companion volumes endeavours to present Gandhi, the man, to the English public, as plainly and impartially as it is possible for a foreigner to do. The many misunderstandings about Gandhi's pacifism are cleared up, especially the calumny that he was pro-Japanese. The man is presented to the public as he really is. Human nature being what it is, Gandhi could succeed only to a limited extent. The author describes the repeated frustrations, from 1922 on, of Gandhi's sincere efforts to create a true and fraternal Indo-British understand-

ing and shows how all these inevitably led to his adoption of "Quit India" as his slogan. What he really meant by it is explained. He wanted the English to come down from their high pedestal to fraternise with the Indians on the plane of common human brotherhood. There is well merited reference to such true Englishmen and Christians as Charles Andrews. That Gandhi should be reckoned as a mere visionary and distrusted by the Power-Politicians of the West is deplored. But it is natural that Gandhi should be the unquestioned leader of the Indian masses, brought up in the tradition of scorning the material and of detestation of soulless brute force; and this the author brings out well. Outwardly he is weak and insignificant, a half-clad figure who travels around India in uncomfortable third-class carriages, sharing the inconveniences that fall to the lot of the ordinary peasant. It is from his character and loftiness of purpose that his authority derives its strength. The author realises that it is due to the preachings of Gandhi that India is what it is today.

M. A. JANAKI

Studies: Islamic and Oriental. By AHMED MIAN AKHTAR. (Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore. Rs. 8/-)

This is a reprint of ten papers by the learned author on diverse subjects. The book would hardly interest the general reader but for the Orientalist interested in odds and ends of Islamic cultural subjects of the medieval times it is a mine of well-authenticated information. In many cases well-printed Arabic and Persian texts are given together with translations in English and the author's interpretation and comment. Two chapters deal with *warāqat* or the arts of copying and illustrating books, book-binding and the book trade in general, as practised in the Abbaside period and after. There is a chapter on the Arabic poetry of Hafiz, though all that Hafiz did was to interpolate some Arabic couplets between the verses of his Persian ghazals. In another short chapter the author propounds the question whether Shams Tabriz, the teacher of Maulana Rumi, was an Ismailian and comes to the conclusion that he was not. One wonders what useful purpose is served by this. There is a very ably written sketch of the life and work of Al-Māwardī the jurisconsult of Basra. Perhaps the most interesting chapter is the one dealing with a tract of Avicenna translated by Omar Khayyam into Persian. This makes very interesting reading. The author is at his best in translation from medieval Persian and Arabic. Students of Hindu systems of philosophy would find this Muslim view of absorbing interest. Historians may discover some interesting data in the chapter dealing with the Arabic sources of the Gurjrat Sultanate and also in the chapter "The Tribulations of India" which deals with a little known Persian Mathnavi pertaining to Wars of Succession between Aurangzeb and his brothers. This is probably a hitherto neglected source of Aurangzeb's history. There is also an interesting chapter on the poet Saadi's visit to Somnath. The book is well-printed and two valuable indices increase its usefulness for the serious reader. The author, who is a Qadi of Junagadh, has followed the research method of European scholars in dealing with the varied subjects dealt with in this small volume.

A. G. CHAGLA

THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD OUTLOOK

[This is the first of five reports, specially written for THE ARYAN PATH by **Mr. R. L. Megroz,** of a course of lectures on "Contemporary World Outlooks" organised by the British Institute of Philosophy. The lectures were delivered at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W. C. I., during the autumn of 1946.—ED.]

Dr. F. Sherwood Taylor, Curator of the Museum of the History of Science, Oxford, took as his subject "The Scientific World Outlook" when he spoke on October 11 in Bloomsbury under the auspices of the British Institute of Philosophy. He spoke as a student of scientific procedure rather than as a scientist and he began by distinguishing between science itself and a scientific outlook. The word science in its legitimate modern usage, he said, represented both a kind of knowledge and a method of obtaining that knowledge. Science was an objective body of facts and relationships concerning the physical world, arrived at by scientific observation and reasoning. Thus the word science could be used to denote the method employed to obtain scientific knowledge. It was the key to the investigation of nature.

But the scientific world outlook involved the attitude of a man to the whole of that of which he was conscious. It was largely the way in which the scientist confronted that which had not yet been elucidated by science. The human mind had to act as integrator of scientific facts and summaries and so formed a scientific world-picture, which thus contained an element which was not science in its strictest sense. And yet the scientific attitude today was continually taken to include even decisions as to conduct; but in fact the actual decision or choice implied in an "outlook" could not be described as science itself, the data of which were distinguished from other branches of knowledge by (*a*) community and (*b*) certainty. However complex might be the scientific work, it could be checked by anybody who studied the technique: it was not esoteric. More important than this characteristic of community in science was its certainty. Even where the scientist's conclusions could not be regarded as finally accurate, he knew the degree of error possible in each observation.

To ensure accuracy, however, not only technique of observation was necessary but also freedom from bias of the kind that might operate to ignore some observations and favour others. That bias was difficult to eliminate. Therefore even in science some men had their hobby-horses. But scientific papers were published and were open to free criticism, and the pet theory of one man became the chosen target of another, so that in general we might think that bias in scientific work was likely to be eliminated.... Generally speaking, there was indeed an anxious striving to supersede or improve upon what had been done.

This likelihood of accuracy and freedom from bias, the speaker stressed, applied only to those subjects capable of scientific observation. What then was the characteristic outlook of scientific men on the nature of things? The scientific man, taking his stand

upon the known, that which science had investigated, would proceed to nibble away at the unknown, never ignoring already known data. Science might be pictured as a tree of knowledge growing in a measureless void of non-knowledge. Like a tree it proceeded from the trunk outwards; but never hurled a conjecture into the midst of the darkness that surrounded it. This scientific world, therefore, even today had no conscious metaphysics, although even a mathematician had to have a metaphysic. The scientist as such never attempted merely *a priori* decisions; the criterion of the success of his work was simply that his science should "work." Indeed scientists did not believe in reason. Every stage in investigation was checked by further investigation—a trial to discover whether the conclusions he had drawn by reasoning were true, whether the conclusions could predict what natural phenomena would occur.

This was why, the speaker thought, the scientist was so little interested in philosophy—all he wanted was to predict phenomena correctly. He might make assumptions, but all he wanted was that they should lead to laws which would afford him a system for arriving at reliable conclusions about phenomena. To the scientist, as J. J. Thomson said, theory was useful only for pointing to further investigation. Now the scientist saw the whole world as the product of the interaction of gravitational, electrical and magnetic forces.... He had gone some of the way towards explaining the behaviour of matter in terms of these combinations, but this led to a number of problems, *e. g.*, how were such gravitational, electrical and magnetic forces related? All scientific explanations thus led in the end to questions. There would always be a further question to ask. This the scientist was able to and should frankly accept, but he was not always so clearly aware of what he did not know in adopting a world view, and might think it to be more complete than it was.

The speaker sketched the rapid progress in the study of inorganic matter in modern times through which it had become possible to make statements about entities that were strictly not imaginable, yet which were capable of being proved. The atom bomb had proved the truth of such abstractions in a voice of thunder. The scientific picture was dynamic—it showed us the activity of things and finally the enormous energy which underlay every kind of matter. It was a picture which showed everything kept in motion by the high-grade heat energy of the stars running down into low-grade heat energy—an apparently irreversible process—strangely resembling the Aristotelian and medieval conceptions, though the terms differed.

But the wonder of the picture should not blind us to its incompleteness. The elementary entities remained unexplained and perhaps inexplicable. When the living instead of the non-living was the subject of observation—and it was not yet even demonstrated where the distinction occurred between living and non-living—the difficulties increased. Instead of arguing about life like the metaphysician, the scientist tried experiments and analysed the process of life into its simplest elements. Such research had no assurance yet of ultimate success, though it was what Bacon called " an element of light "; whether it succeeded or not

it could never disappoint us....

Where knowledge was lacking the gap was temporarily filled by the scientific outlook. Some scientists would not admit that anything existed which could not be explained in terms of the factors studied in chemistry and physics. The discontinuities in knowledge increased, however, when we came to Man. We were conscious of a world of images, concepts, which was sundered from what science studied in the world of the non-living or the non-human living. With the help of psychology, it was true we could now formulate fairly accurate laws about the lower aspects of mind and the moods of human beings in relation to certain conditions of environment. But science was concerned in its conclusions with the relations between classes, and the mental content of a human being was so very different from other subjects of investigation that it was impossible to classify it except in very crude categories. The scientist could deal only with determined sequences of cause and effect, but to apply that physical determinism to mind was a distortion of that experience on which all science was ultimately based. We have, for example, direct experience of freedom of will. It would seem, therefore, that the operations of the human mind were necessarily excluded in great measure from the ambit of science.

The speaker concluded that the scientist must either maintain that physical and chemical changes alone accounted for the activity of the human mind or he must greatly enlarge the scope of his scientific method. Failing this he must obtain an adequate scientific outlook. But scientists were also men and citizens who had to make decisions and take action. These were generally concerned with human relationships—private, national or international—and such relationships were not easily handled by scientific methods. An example was the so-called "Scientific Management" in business, which was limited to those elementary aspects of the behaviour of human beings which could be usefully observed by scientific methods. The human will was influenced by so many factors that the establishment of laws of human behaviour was at best a doubtful and approximate task.

But when the scientist fell back on his scientific outlook as a guide he often ignored spiritual and ethical values which were of ascertainable value in human conduct. The materialistic scientist was in fact characterised by his tendency to ignore such values. While he was not prepared to say whether materialism was *de facto* part of the scientific outlook, the speaker thought the majority of scientists, though not convinced or dogmatic, would adopt a materialist attitude and deny such a thing as soul or spirit. The discoveries of modern science about matter were not likely to establish or demolish materialism but as the scientist was becoming an important person, able to advise our governments, there was a danger in the inability of science to make certain choices between "good" and "bad" so that the scientist could only fall back on his personal attitude. As a result of his early training perhaps and his ethical attitude, he might desire that humanity should enjoy good things, and that health, education, physical comfort and security should be shared by all. He could say nothing

about any higher things than these modest goods, to obtain which he was prone to insist on a machine-like efficiency of society that might ignore the needs of the individual. He hoped that scientists of the future would try by a new technique to use higher levels of the human mind, applying a method like that which had proved so successful, *viz.*, through religion. Let the same attention be given to religion as was being given to science and the question would solve itself to the extent of settling the main lines of ethical conduct. The only hope for the world, the speaker thought, was the incorporation of religious, philosophical and scientific outlooks in a single comprehensive view.

R. L. MEGROZ

NATIONAL WELFARE AS WOMEN SEE IT

The All-India Women's Conference brought out not long ago a *Memorandum on Planning for National Welfare* as temperate in expression as it is fundamentally humane in approach. It has been suggested—sometimes, we suspect, with tongue in cheek—that chances for world peace would be greater with women at the helm. Admittedly women generally are conservative and often find it difficult to take the wide, impersonal view. Inability to see the wood for the trees is a handicap, but is it a less serious one to see only the wood, as politicians sometimes do, and forget the living trees without which there would be no wood at all ?

This Memorandum is concerned primarily not with National wealth and prestige, not with opportunities for amassing private fortunes, but with the welfare of the common citizen.

It calls for universal adult suffrage, for the abolition of all disabilities imposed by man by reason of caste, creed or sex. It demands for every citizen "economic and social security, full facilities for education, medical aid, and an adequate standard of living," and "equal opportunities for the fullest self-expression." Its plea for industrialisation is directed especially to the transformation of rural economy and the provision of maximum employment. It makes the revolutionary suggestion of levelling incomes, and demands industrial and social-security legislation. Its educational proposals are broad and forward-looking, important among them being the withholding of State aid from denominational institutions. It demands also a wide range of health services, free to those who cannot pay, recreational opportunities for children and adults and Social Service Ministries.

The Conference declares that

> Work is a social duty of the citizen, by the accomplishment of which he acquires the right to an existence which is in conformity with his own capacities and compatible with human dignity.

A valuable feature of the Memorandum is this emphasis on duties, side by side with rights. Only as that point of view gains wider recognition will India and the world approach the fundamental concept of the State as school and training-ground for citizens.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

MM. Prof. P. V. Kane's presidential address at the Thirteenth Session of the All India Oriental Conference, opened at Nagpur on October 19th, was a masterpiece of analysis of the present state of Indological studies in India—projects, opportunities and handicaps. Among the last-named is the fact that, at a time when the preoccupation of Europe's best minds with rehabilitation problems lays on Indian scholars an added responsibility for Indological projects, Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic are being cold-shouldered by partisans of the regional languages, of a national language, or of English.

The trend in Indian education toward science and away from the humanities is another major problem. The profit motive is prominent among the causes of that trend. Scholars, however rich in learning, are generally poor in purse. But the very fact that our economic order offers higher rewards to the possessors of technological skill than to the upholders of cultural values is itself a symptom of the modern topsyturvydom. Hands and the knowledge of how to use them are very necessary but it is at its peril that any civilisation exalts them at the cost of that balance between head, heart and hands which is the essence of culture. Whither the hands and head alone can lead us, the desolation that was Hiroshima shows. The best of India's inheritance offers the corrective of the present unbalance in what Professor Kane called " the solid foundations that have withstood the storms, the burdens and the wear and tear of ages." "It is up to us," he added,

> not to allow, as long as there is life in us, the great ideals and achievements of the past to be swept off altogether by the onrushing avalanche of conflicting and ill-digested ideas.

Professor Kane's enumeration of the needs of Indological research included the completion of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute's critical edition of the *Mahabharata*, an inclusive Sanskrit dictionary on scholarly lines, the collection, conservation, cataloguing and publication of old manuscripts, an annual bibliography of Oriental studies, the study of India's ancient cultural influence and the amalgamation of some at least of the several projected histories of India by Indian scholars. He did well to call attention, while approving the attempting by Indian scholars of a history of their own culture and literature, to a danger generally overlooked. Indian scholars, he pointed out, have their own bias to guard against, however different from that of European scholars.

> Most of us are unwilling to admit infusion of foreign races or foreign influence on our culture and are easily inclined to claim high antiquity and originality for everything Indian.

India has nothing to gain and much to lose by her sons putting forward untenable claims on her behalf. The

glories of her past need no embellishment. A bias is a bias and, where history is concerned, the fact's the thing !

The background and basic facts of the Bengal famine were statistically analyzed by Prof. P. C. Mahalanobis, F. R. S. He presented his findings to the East India Association at London on July 25th, in an address published in the October *Asiatic Review*. His inquiry, which had covered a random selection of nearly 16,000 families in 41 widely scattered villages of Bengal, had revealed a deplorable and worsening economic situation in the pre-famine period, January 1939 to January 1943. The number of families whose economic position was improving was small and very many more were growing poorer or crossing the line into destitution.

In the famine period the rate of deterioration and destitution became violently accelerated. But the land position in predominantly agricultural rural Bengal was already extremely precarious. About three-fourths of the group surveyed owned less than two acres of rice land per family, *i. e.*, less than the estimated subsistence level. When the famine came, large numbers of the poorer families lost all. The surprising thing, given the conditions described, is that roughly 85 per cent. of the families maintained their *status quo* under the strain of famine conditions.

The statistics so carefully amassed and analyzed should furnish a useful guide for economic planning, though Professor Mahalanobis reports a deaf ear turned to his efforts to induce the Bengal Government to take the problem seriously. But it should not be necessary for him to insist that the Bengal famine was " not an accident, " " like, " he adds, " an earthquake or a flood. " Is any event an isolated phenomenon ? Do effects ever come without causes ? Even floods are today conceded to have causes, prominent among which is deforestation brought about by human greed. Some day, let us hope soon, the intimate connection between man and nature will be clearly seen. Meantime the cause-effect sequence is plain in such an obviously man-made catastrophe as visited Bengal in 1943. It is for the Government to take the necessary steps to avert the repetition of the tragedy ; and that demands far-reaching economic reforms.

Dr. Radhakamal Mukerjee, Economic Adviser, Gwalior State, warns in *Asia* and the Americas of September against the economic dismemberment of India. Without co-ordinate planning and effective central control, India can be neither prosperous at home nor effective abroad. The country is not only a geographic and a cultural but also an economic unit. It will be disastrous, Dr. Mukerjee maintains, for groups within the country to have separate systems of currency, of company law, and of banking. Recurrent economic and monetary crises lie that way. Customs and tariffs are outside the scope of the Centre under the present Constitutional proposals. Shall we have the spectacle of hostile tariff barriers between the different parts of India ? The States of the U. S. A. may not impose tariffs against each other and to the resulting freedom of exchange of goods not a little of the success of the American Union is ascribed.

Without power at the Centre also to co-ordinate conflicting interests of dif-

ferent regions, *e. g.*, in water schemes, in famine control etc., without uniform income and corporation taxes and excise duties, there is bound to be confusion, friction, impotence.

Political independence...will lose much of its worth for the common man in India if it...be bought at the expense of poverty and agricultural depression, which will be bound to result from economic dismemberment and inter-regional economic confusion and conflict.

India need not be hungry, declared Mr. F. L. Brayne, former Financial Commissioner for Development in the Panjab, in a recent letter to the London *Times*. He blamed many factors for the present low yields—none of them irremediable—" erosion, bad seed, bad cattle, bad implements, bad methods, bad health and bad economic and social customs." The remedies were simple and sure.

The big problem is not to discover ways of increasing the produce; it is to persuade the people to apply the ways already known. To achieve this great objective, publicity of all kinds, Eastern and Western, ancient and modern, must be developed on a scale hitherto undreamt of.

His proposal that the 2,000,000 ex-servicemen be organised as "pioneers and demonstrators of a new way of life" may not commend itself to all. Public servants who will "learn and live and teach a new life" and "work together as a team, at all levels from the village to the seat of Government," and who will be "more concerned for the welfare of the people than for their own livelihood," are not to be had for any "pay, prospects and training" unless the urge to service is already there. All will agree, however, as to the necessity of educating village women and enlisting their co-operation in the task, which Mr. Brayne urged in "Women and Indian Villages" in our June 1946 issue.

We agree that the organisation of the Indian villages for their betterment can best be on co-operative lines. There will be a real danger of economic disequilibrium when the villagers, their enthusiasm for better living standards aroused, give up "their besetting sins, litigation and extravagant expenditures on ornaments and social ceremonies." The first and last are in most cases admittedly sheer waste, but ornaments have been the poor man's bank and, if his money saved on them is not to trickle uselessly away, Mr. Brayne's recommendation of a savings system reaching every village must be instituted concurrently with the better-living publicity.

Attempts of Governments to direct artistic efforts in approved channels, as formerly in Nazi Germany and in Soviet Russia still, have been bitterly resented and assailed by the defenders of freedom of expression as the life-breath of art. Artists in most countries have taken the position that literature worthy of the name cannot be produced to order. This appears to be true only if the artist differs from the ideology he is expected to uphold. The bud that hides the canker of insincerity at its heart can never open into the perfect rose.

But the past ages have produced much literature frankly propagandist in aim, whether that aim was political, religious or other. "Literature and Propaganda" are not mutually exclusive categories, as Prof. G. C. Bannerjee brought out in his lecture at Bombay on 7th November, under the auspices of the P. E. N. All-India Centre. "Man," he declared, "is a proselytising animal." Ardent convictions in any sphere are bound to colour his writings, but it must be his own ideas, his own feelings for which he seeks expression. Made-to-order writing very rarely reaches the artistic heights, but much fine writing has had an underlying moral purpose.

Propaganda does not become literature merely because cast in a literary form. It becomes literature only when fusion takes place between the writer's idea and the symbol which he has found to clothe it in. And the creative spark, essential to that fusion, no commission from State or private patron can ensure.

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